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IN THE Sill'REME CO!Tfn' OJ<' TTIESTATJ<: OF TTTAH 
LOREN 1{. BROCKBANK, et al., 
-vs-
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
Case No. 1600CJ 
.JAY B" BALDWIN, JR., et al., 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
---------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a class action suit brought by Plaint.itT~-RPsponclPnts 
sPeking a judicial determination of the inapplicability of a residPntial 
restrictive covenant to a subdivision lot intended for and spPcifically 
resPrved and designated by the subdivision developer· for cnrnmr>rcial 11se. 
DJSPC>SITION IN THE DJSTniCT COURT 
Plaintiffs-Respondents moved for s11mmary .iuclgment. On 
April 7, 1978, oral argument was had in the Di~trirt Co~1rt nf S>.lt Lakr· 
County. The CoCJrt, after taking the matter unclc>r advi~c>rnent, grantPcl 
Pia intiffs- Respondents' Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT OJ\ Af'PE\L 
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek affirmance of the .iL1dgment qf the 
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STATEi\lENT OF FACTS 
I'L' illtirr~-l{v,;pondents disagree with the Statement of 
l'ctcb .-;d f•)t·th in tlw br·icf of Defendants-Appellants and there follows 
:1 cor11·ise statetllcnt of tlw material facts of this case. 
Plaintiffs- Respondent.-; .t re the owners of an undeveloped 
tr.1ct of pr·opt•r-t' 111 till' 1\lL Olympu.-; !lills No. 1 Subdivisioe1 in S:~lt 
l.ak< Cc)rirlt\. II\~. :L)). ThL• tract is ,.;lightly Jar·gcr than five acre" 111 
~izc·, howev<'t', 11 tl•<' t1•11e lht• ofl'it ial 'oi!bdivisron plat was recorded, 
tht· lot we!" in exct -." nftt·n a<TPS in ,;izt·. 
In .1 ttrll ,)f 1 'J:i6, in th•· COitl'.~l' of developinJ.': the subdivision, 
H. Hr·ockb.1nk, t·.tust·d tl11· offit·ial jJ!.,t of tlw \it. Olyrnpu,.; Hills No. 
loC".ttron of tht• 1-lr·~e t•·:1 u.:r·,. tr·act in tire ~uhdivi,.,ion. l'rintcd in the 
art•:l of such tr.tct on till· pl:.t ",.,. the nun••"·.tl "!"and tht• won].., 
".SJI(li'I'INI: Cl·:l\ITEH 
CCl~·J<\JI·:W::I,\1. ZClNJ•; C-1" 
Th<· t•·n ·u'f'<' tr·.,ct, no<A ·qli>C<>.\IT!Ltt<·ly fivt• acres, is herein-
" Br·ockh.tnk c.llh<·d to],,. pr.,paned tnd r<'cnnl .. d .t "l{e,.;tri<·li\·e Covenant" 
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documc·nt rdL•renccJ to the official plat previously recorded as the 
1\lt. Olymptt,; Hills No. 1 Subdivision. (R 15, 114). The covenants 
are largely designed to impose restrictions on the residential use of 
the ,;everal hundred small lots contained on the plat and were by their 
very language inapplicable to a lot the size, shape, location and 
character of the large commercial lot. Nevertheless, the all inclusive 
language of the covenant could seemingly be construed to include the 
commercial lot. 
Pursuant to their plan to develop the commercial lot as 
a shopping center, the Brockbanks made application to the county to zone 
the commet·cial lot as Commercial Zone C-1 and such application was 
approved by the county. (R 116). Later, the Brockbanks, upon threat 
of condemnation, sold to the State Road Commission approximately five 
acres of the then ten acre tract. The Road Commission paid several 
times what the property was worth as a residential property recognizing 
it was intended and zoned for commercial use as a shopping center. 
(R 116). Some time thereafter, application was made to the county for 
a conditional use permit to develop the lot for commercial purposes. 
(R 116). 
Title to the commercial lot was Stlbsequently transferred to 
Loren and \• on Brockbank, the sons of Bernard P. and Nada R. Brockbank, 
and still later, Von, along with his wife, Vickie, became the sole 
owners of the comnwrcial lot and are the remaining Plaintiffs-Respondents 
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in this ciCtion. (I{ 4). 
In 1975, Plaintiffs-Respondents attempted to obtain financ:i ng 
to develo;..> the commercial lot as a shopping center. 1t was at this time 
that Plaintiffs-Respondents learned that lending institutions would not 
finance the proposed development without a judicial determination as to 
the inappiic.J.bility of the residential restrictions contained in the restrictive 
coven::~nts to the commercial lot. Plaintiffs-Respondents then brought 
this cL.l:-,s ·;ction ,;UJt joining as defendants, all property owners of the 
lob to whos'' benef1t the covenants inured. 
l'laintiff>i-Respomlents' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
gr~lllled on the grounds that the commercial lot is not restrictively limiteJ 
by tlw covenant:; which bo~wd the other lots in the subdivision development 
to which issue the District Court found there were no issue,; of fact raised 
either by the pleadings, the Affidavits of Defendants-Appellants or of the 
arguments of their counc;el which needed to be tried by a finder of fact. 
A H.C:UMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL J(JlX;E WAS JUSTIFIED IN(; RANT!NC THE MOTION FOR 
SUl\11\IA R\ .Tl'DCl\1ENT 1\S THERE EXISTED NO C ENUINE ISSUE OF 
l\IATERIAL Fi1CT. 
\ n expeditious disposition of cases is a c-.1rdinal virtue of 
the admini~trc1tion of justice, as .Judge, later Justice, Ce~rdozo said: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by he Instit te of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
The vc:rv object of a motion for summary judgment 
is to separate what is formal or pretended in 
denial or averment from what is genuine and sub-
,;tuntial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor 
to the burden of a trial. Richard vs. Credit Swisse, 
242 NY 346, 152 NE 110, 111 (1926). 
This Court has long held that although a summary judgment must be 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the losing party, 
... the trial judge not only can but should grant a 
motion for summary judgment if he feels certain 
that he would rule that way no matter what proof a 
party could produce in support of his contentions. 
Allen's Products Company vs. Glover, et al., 18 
utah 2d 9, 414 P. 2d 93, 94 (1966). (See also 
Pioneer Savings and Loan Association vs. Pioneer 
Finance and Thrift Company, 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 
P. 2d 121 (1966). 
In contesting the motion for summary judgment in the trial court, Defendants-
Appellants relied upon the allegations of their answer (R 80) and three 
affidavits, (R 219, 237, 239) none of which raised any material issues of 
fact which necessitated a finding by a trier of fact. 
In the case of Walker vs. Rocky l\ilountain Recreation Corp. 
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P. 2d 538 (HJ73), which the Defendants-Appellants 
cite in their brief, this Court held that the entry of summary judgment is 
proper where the affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment 
reveals no evidentiary facts, but merely sets forth the affiant's unsub-
stantiated opinions and conclusions. Further, the language the Defendants-
Appellants omitted from their quotation is highly relevant to the deter-
min:ttio•l of this is,..ue. (Defendants-Appellants' Brief page 14). The 
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Tilr· clppo,;int.: .tfi'iLLl\it :-iLlbmitted by dcfenu.J.nt Liid 
110t comport with the r·t'quircmenb of Hulc 56(e), 
ll. lt. C. P., i. c., such an :1ffidctvit must be made 
on pcr,;on.ll knowledge of the affiant, and set forth 
LLL ts that would be ddmissible in evidence :1nd sin w 
th.J.t the• affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated thc::rein. Statements made merely on infor-
mation and belief will hL' di,;regarded. Hearsay and 
opinion testimony that would not be admis.~ible if 
k,;tificd to .tt the trial may not prOfJerly be set 
forth in an .tffid:J.Vit. 
\ review of defendant's OfJfJOsing affid.J.vit reveals 
no ,,, identi:t ry facts but merely rct1ects the 
.•ffietnt's un,;ubstantiated opinions and conclusions in 
rr·.f.'ard to the tr.tn,;ctctions. (lei. at 542). 
The samL' -;tatL·n~t·nl L·an hr• made as regards the affidavits of Defendants-
Appelbnts. l~ule :J6(c). l•tc;h Ruh's of Civill'rocedure sbtl's, in pertinent 
part: 
Tlw judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the' pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and J.dmissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, 1f any, show that there is no genuine 
i"sue as to ::tny material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgmm t as a matter of law. 
Sub,;edion (e) of the s.lme Rule states, in pertinent part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
suppor·ted a" provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not n·st upon the mere allegations or· 
denial,o of its pleading, but his re,.;ponse, by affidavit 
or .ts otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facb, :ihowing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. li he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, sh::tll be entered J.gain,.;t him. 
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"v11·ttully ell I of tlw llll'llll>c:r.~ of tlw Cbs . .; had purchased their properi;y 
in rc'liancc· Ot: tlw rc·~u·ictive covenc1nt" (R 84) Defendants-Appellants 
were 01hle to ol>te1in from the over 300 class members, only two affidavits, 
one Ly tht•H' c·ounsel. ln his Affidavit, DefemLl.nt Don Smith states: 
That he knew of the restrictive covenant covered 
by Lot 1 and relied thereon in his purchase of 
tlw property. (R 237) 
A cardul cx.uninatio:t of this statement will reveal that the Affiant is not 
stating a matc~r1al is~uc of fact, but rather c1n unsub~tant1atcd conclusion, 
which would be an in<Jdmissible opinion that the covenant was applicable to 
Lot 1, inasmuch as that is the basis of this class action suit. Under the 
Walker case, supra, this would be insufficient to oppose a motion for 
summary judgment. Smith does not say that he believed that the restrictive 
covenant applied to Lot 1 or that he relied on any such belief in purchasing 
his property. He is merely stating that he relied on a covenant which he 
described as "covered by Lot 1" (perhaps he meant covering Lot 1). Mr. 
Spafford's Affidavit, m addition to being merely the self-serving attempt 
by cour.sel to bolster his defense, and if given at trial would have likely 
been disbelieved by the finder of fact (See Howick vs. Bank of Salt Lake, 
28 (ltah 2cl 64, 498 P. 2d 352 (1972)), suffers the same deficiencies present 
in 1\1 r •. Snnth 1 ,.; Affidavit described above. Mr. Spafford merely states 
that at th<' time he purchased some of the property in question "Affiant 
wac; mformcd of and relied upon t11e langu:1ge of said restrictive covenant". 
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(I{ 2201. This llllStJbc;t;,ntiateu conclusion (Walker,~~) does not 
cv<'ll llll'llt\On the possibility of the application to Lot 1 of the restrictive 
c·m·,.,,~u1b respecting residential use. 
:\t·cording to West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. § 437 c: 
•\ n affidavit opposing motion for summary judgment 
does not raise triable fact issue, unless it states 
Ltcts showing thclt [the] rnrty has a good and sub-
,bntial defense or that a good cause of action exists 
on merits. 
It is no wonucr that nc•ither Smith nor Spafford came right out 
and llleeeLI til tt they believed the residential use covenants applied to the 
<'011\lllt'l'Cul Int. In or:J,•r tn havc· the slightest notio'> that the restric·iv? 
l'OITiianLi might hctve applieu to the large ten, later five, acr~ tract of 
l!nne' Plop,•cl Ltnd, one would have to look at the plat referr·ed to if' t)1 
,.,._t,·ictilc ,·overLtnb documL·nt SlrH r· tht: plat was the only reference 
,JJ,•winl! wJ,idJ property wa.~ argu~d>ly coverecllJy tht· restrictive covt'n:tntc, 
t-:, \'It ~1 1 tll':-JUr\ cx,tmin:ltion of t}H· plat quickly discloses the fact that the 
'Dlllm<·L···'·'' lot wOJ.:; rL'"''rvr•d for development as a shopping center. Tht· 
t<"l :tL'I'L' lot. :tpfwaring on th<· plat to 1.,,. some Hurty or forty tl!nes brgc~· 
tlLlll thl' J'l'.~i<lcnti~L! Jut-., wa,: cl<·~u·ly .tnd boldly iclent1fied ill capita' 
enn"1'' n:~;tl lot. It i· :m;J<,rt: nt tr 'JOt<· that nl'tthcr Smith nor· Sp::tlonl 
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allege: 
1. The1t he read the residential use restrictions, or 
2. That he believed that the residential use restrictions 
ap;Jlied to the ten acre commercial lot, or 
3. That he relied on SllCh a belief in pllrchasing his 
property. 
Instead, they have made a bare assumption or conclusion 
not sLipported by the undisputed facts. Even if Mr. Smith or Mr. Spafford 
h<1d asserted in their Affidavits that they had relied on the fact that the 
residential use restrictions applied to the large undeveloped tract and 
the trial court found such reliance, under the undisputed facts set forth 
above, the cout·t was well within its discretion to rule as a matter of law 
that such reliance was not :oufficient to estop Plaintiffs-Respondents from 
asserting that the residential use restrictions were never intended to 
apply to the commercial lot. 
Under Utah law, the party alleging estoppel must establish: 
1. That his reliance was reasonable and that in so relying 
he u;;ed rcasoCJable prudence and diligence. (Morgan vs. Board of State 
Land;;) 549 P. 2d 695, 697 (Utah, 1976), Baggs vs. Anderson, 528 P. 2d 
141, 143 (Utah, 1974), and J. P. Koch, Inc. vs. J. C. Penney Company, 
lnc., 534 P. :2d 903, 905 (Utah, 1975); 
:2. That he substantially changed his position to his detriment 
, 1 ~ a r,·sult of o-;uc:h rPliance, Baggs, supra, at page 143 and J. P. Koch, 
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,;upr,;, :tt p.tl'L' !J05; :ll1d 
:;. That he would not have so changed hi,; position except 
for the co'lduct of the other 1Jat'ty. (Kelly vs. Richards, 83 P. 2d 731, 
734 (l'tah, 1 !138)). 
With respect to the last two requirements neither Mr. Smith 
nor 1\lr. Spafford has stated in his Affidavit that he suffered any detri-
ment or that he would not have bought his property but for his reliance. 
\\ ith r·espect to the fir,;t requirement of reasonable reliance, 
not onlv havp 1\lr. :-;mtth and Mr. Spafford failed to a,;sert reasonable 
reliam·e, but e'en it th,•y had, the tr·i,t! court was well within its discretion 
to rule that based upon the undisputed fact;.;, such reliance, if any, was 
um·easonaLle as a mattpr of law. As indicated ahove, neither Mr. Smith 
nor lV1 r. Spafford could have had any inkling that the residential use 
restriction might have applied to the large undeveloped tract of land 
without first examining the recorded plat which plainly sets forth that 
the tract was reserved for commercial use as a shopping center. As such, 
i'vlr. Smith's and Mr. Spafford's reliance on the assumption that the 
residential use restrictions applied to Lot 1 would be patently unreason-
al,lc>. Even if Mr. Smith and Mr. Spafford had not examined the recorded 
plat, (in which case they CO'.lld not have had any idea th;;t the restrictive 
covenant,; might have even arguably included the commPr'cial lot) their 
relidnce, if any, woulcl still have been unreasonable, for as the Utah 
Supreme Court stated 0'1 page 697 of the 1\lorgan case in Footnote 4: 
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The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not operate 
in favor of one who has knowledge of the essential 
facts or one who has convenient and available means 
of obtaining such knowledge. 
Assummg arguendo, the alleged facts raised by the affidavits 
were established, they would not have precluded summary judgment, 
since they do not go to the basis of the Motion, that being the interpreta-
tior1 of the restrictive covenant to the large commercial lot. As this 
Court said in the case of Rich vs. McGovern, on the question of review 
of a s umrna ry judgment: 
..• [I]nasmuch as the party moved against is being 
defeated without the privilege of a trial, the court 
should carefully scrutinize the 'submissions' and 
contentions he makes thereon to see if his contentions 
and proposals as to proof of material facts, if 
resolved in his favor, would entitle him to prevail 
551 P. 2d 1266, 1268 (Utah, 1976), 
At most, the resolution of the issue of reliance in favor of the 
Defendants-Appellants would have given rise to a suit for monetary damages, 
not dismissal of the motion for summary judgment on the interpretation of 
the covenants' applicability. It is no wonder Defendants-Appellants did 
not rely on thP element of damages since despite the unreasonableness 
of any alleged reliance, the homeowners in the class most affected have 
ctlready received the benefit of the large lot being reserved for commercial 
use. It is undisputt>d that those lots facing the commercial lot were sold 
tor onr>-half price. As such, any effort on the part of those homeowner 
Ddendanb-,\ppclLtnb or their· successors to halt development of the 
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comnwrct,d Jot for· the pur-po'<e for· which it was intended would result 
in an unju,.;t cnr·iclnncnt to th,~m. 
It is clectr that neither the answer nor the Affidavits filed by 
DefendJ.nts-Appellants raise any material is:;ues of fact and a;; ;;uch, the 
trial court was amply within its discretion to grant the motion for 
summary judgment. 
POINT T1 
WHERE THE !JOC\TJ\IENT TO BE CONSTRUED WAS CLEARLY AMBIC-
UOllS, THE TRlAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING THE INTENT 1 
OF THE SPBDT\ ISION DEVELOPER. 
It is unctcs.tiLlble that the language of the restrictive covenants 
explicitly rders to, and unquestionably incorporates, the subdivision plat. 
Indeed, the :;ubdivision plat is critical in order to identify the pro;:>erty to 
which the restrictive covenants apply. The covenant describes the 
restricted property as: 
All of Mt. Olympus Hills No. 1 and No. 3,according 
to the official plat thereof on file in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County. (R 15). 
A r'":;trictive covenant is a contract. (37A Words and Phr;_~sb, 
Restrictive Covenants). It is well settled that: 
•.. it b the general rule that where a contract 
r·cfers to, and incorporates the provisions of another 
instrument they shall be construed together. 17A 
C".T .S. Contrctcts § 299. 
This Court in Bullfrog J\•larin:.t, Inc, vs. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 1'. Zd 
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~66 (19721 hdd that: 
... where two or more instruments are executed 
by the same parties contemporaneously, or at 
different times in the course of the same transaction, 
and concern the same subject matter, they will be 
read and construed together so far as determining 
the respective rights and interests of the parties 
(!d. at 271 ). (See also 4 Williston on Contracts, 
3rd Ed,)§ 628 p. 904). 
Reference to the official subdivision plat shows the large ten acre (now 
five acre) commercial lot clearly identified as "SHOPPING CENTER 
CO!VIl\1 EH.CIA L ZONE C -1 ". The restricti vc: covenants seem to indicate 
tlut all lob arc to be used for r·c;-;idential pu~po.'ies with the exception of two 
lob for schools and churches. As such, it is apparent that the intent of 
the develo;wr cannot be ascertained from the four corners of the document 
itself. In the c:ctse of such an ambiguity, the court was justified in con-
sider'ing extrinsic £>vidence to establish the intent of the subdivision 
In" similar situation where this Court was addressing itself 
to the proper CO'lstruction of a real estate covenant it said: 
In view of the absence of a clear and definite 
exprc,.;sion in the contracts, it was proper for 
the trial court to take extraneous evidence and 
to look to the total circumstance;; to ascertain tl,e 
intent. First Western Fidelity vs. Gibbons & Reed 
Company, 27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P. 2d 132, 134 (1971). 
1t is well settled that: 
The fundamental rule in construing restrictiv'~ covenants 
1s that the intention of the parties as shown by the 
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cov c·runt goverii~ • . . In the determin;~tion of the 
int<·rttion or the 1urtic·s, the entirl' context or the 
cov<·n,tnl i,; to 1.Je considered. [20 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Coven~nts, Co:-~ditiOns ~nd Re,.;tt·ictio~1s, ~186 p. 
75:l]. 
l'ur·ther, this Court has st~ted w1th respect to the interpre-
tation of restrictive covenants: 
The intentions of the parties, as g~thered from the sur-
rounding circumstances, ~nd purpose of the restriction, 
n111st be considered ~nd given effect. Metropolitan 
Investment Company vs. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P. 2d 
!1-10, 045 (1>162). 
Pl~intiffs-Respondenb do not dispute the proposition that extrinsic 
evidence is inc~clmissiblc· to vary tlw terms of an unambiguous document, 
however·, this cl e.1 rh ,,~ 110t controlling in thP instant case. 
It is true that the express term;; of an agreement may not 
be abrogated, nullified or mo::lified by parol testimony; 
but where, because of vaguenes,; or uncertainty in the 
language used, the intent of the parties is in question, the 
co:.~rt may consider the situation of the parties, the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, 
the purpose of its execution and the respective claims 
thereunder, to ascertain what the parties intended. 
Continental Bark & Trust Company vs. Stewart, 4 Utah 
2cl 228, 291 p. 2d 890, 892 (1955 ). 
The blatant cont1ict between the language of the restrictive covenants and 
the official plat incorporated therein makes the intent of the parties unas-
ccr·tainablc without reference to extrinsic evidence. Defendants-Appellant 
reliance on the cases of Commercial Building Corporatioet vs. Blair, 565 
P. 2d 776, ((Jt. 1977); Clyde v;;, Eddington Canning Co., 10 lltah 2d 1-1, 
347 P. 2d 563 (1959); and Pubipher vs. Tolboe, 13 Utah 2d 190, 370 P. 2d 
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360 (1962), is as ;;uch unfounded. In each case, this Court dealt with 
documents in which the language was clear and unambiguous on its face, 
and in which reference was not required to a second document in order 
to determine the intent of the original document. Such is clearly not the 
case with regard to the restrictive covenants in the instant case. As such, 
the lower court did not commit reversible error in considering the intent 
of the subdivision developer who caused the restrictive covenants to be 
drafted. 
POINT III 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS CLEARLY WERE NOT INTENDED TO 
APPLY TO THE COMMERCIAL LOT, AND THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED 
lN SO CONCLUDING. 
When the restrictive covenants document and the recorded 
plat are read together, the undisputed facts established clearly show 
that the express intent of the original subdividers and grantors was that 
the restrictive covenants regarding residential use did not apply to the 
then ten acre tract, which was being reserved for commercial use as a 
shO;:Jping center. The undisputed material facts established by Plaintiffs-
Respondents' Affidavits are as follows: 
(1) The restrictive covenant document explicitly refers to 
and incorporates the plat which clearly identifies the commercial lot as 
"SHOPPINC CENTER COMMERCIAL ZONE C-1" on the face of the plat. 
(R 151, 20~3). 
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(~) It w~,,; nc,er the intention of the grantors that the 
eommt•t·,·i~tl lot wa.~ to l,e :,;ubject to the restrictive covenants. (R 114, 
~09). 
(:l) At the time the plat was recorded, there was no sho:Jping 
center· dnywlwrc near the area. (R 115, 209). 
(.!) Prospective buyers asked which areas had been desig-
nc<ted for ,.,cho:Jls and for shopping, and nearly all prospective buyers would 
not buv a r.c~idential uuilding lot unless they knew where the scho::Jls aml 
,.,hopping ccnkr." '"'-'~'''going to be located. (!{ 115, 209). 
(51 I' cospc•cti ve buyers were shown the plat which identified 
the large tr.1ct a,; 'sllOPf'lNC CENTER COMMERCIAL ZONE C-1" and 
c•ach customer· was shown the location of various lots on the plat. (R 115, 
~00). 
(6) Residential lots facing the ten acre tract includin~ those 
on Westview Drive, were sold at one-half price of the other lots in the 
c;rrbdivision hcc',lUc;e they were facing the shopping center area, and 
pttrchasc es of thos c lot:-o were informed before their purchases that their 
lob wl're l'acing tlw proposed shopping center property which would be 
ust•d tor commerci:\1 pueposcs. (R 115, 209). 
(7) s~llt Lake County zoned the ten acre tract as commercial 
ZonL' C-1 upon tlw application of Bernard P. Brockbank, one of the 
oeiginal ,.,ubdividers J.nd geantors. (R 116, 209). 
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(8) Approximately five acres of the ten acre tract were 
sold to the state for road changes at a price several times what the five 
acres were worth as residential property, based on the value of the 
property for shopping center purposes because the ten acres had been 
reserved for commercial zoning and development as a shopping center. 
(R 116, 209). 
(9) The Plaintiffs-Respondents are paying a commercial 
tax rate on Lot 1 even though it is not being used on a commercial basis 
and Plaintiffs-Respondents are incurring substantial loss for delay in such 
use. (R 103, 210). 
None of these material facts have been disputed. 
That the restrictive covenants document with respect to 
residential use was never intended to apply to the commercial lot is 
further evidenced by the fact that many of the.se restrictive coven'l.nts 
obviously could not apply to the large tract. For example, it would be 
economically unfeasible and patently unreasonable to ~xpect that only one 
detached single-family dwelling not to exceed one and one-half stories in 
height could be built on a ten acre lot some thirty to forty times larger 
than all other surrounding lots, pursuant to Item 1 of the restrictive 
covenants. Furthermore, the side yard lines and interior lot lines 
mentioned in Item 4 of the restrictive covenants do not exist on the ten 
ae re (now five acre) tract. Finally, the rPstriction :tga i nst 0nc ro1chment 
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111 Jt,·tll ~ c.tnnul :tppl) to the commercial lot because it is not ctdjacent 
to _tny oth,·r lob. 
Plaintiffs -l{espondents do not con tend that the zoning of the 
pn.Jiwrty ,.;upcL-;cdcs the language of the restrictive covenanb, however, 
tl11~ Ltct lhctt tl1l' subdivision developer, within two years of the record.J.tion 
ot tilL' ,.;ubuJ\·i;-;io:1 pbt, mauc appliccttion to have the property zoC~ed for 
,,Jllllllct·,· i:ll pur·po.~es cl<•.J.t'h shows that the intent of the developer was 
tlul llw rc;-;tt·idlv•· ·. u\ <·rLulb were in:J.pplic::tble to the large commercial 
lot. 
It i> tiJ, , , :on; obviou:o :.11lll the District Court was justified in 
fincliJ1g, th:J.t thL· J'''"id,·nti:J.I n:strictio::~c; were never intended to 'J.pply to 
the L'Ommerc:i:tl lot. 
!'OINT IV 
TilE TR11\L COIJI{T'S IU:FiiSAL TO CONSJDEH DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS' DEI,.ENSE OF' STATUTE OF Lli\!ITATIONS IS NOT 
JU·:VJ<;RSlBLE EHI{OR WHERE THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE 
NOT SEEK!NC HEFOR~IAT!ON OF THE DOCUMENTS IN THEIH 1\JOT!O~ 
I<'OH Slil\11\li\ R\ JlJDC:J\IEWC 
l'bintiff.c-H<·spond(•nts' Firo,t C:J.uc,c• of Actiol1 in their Compl:un 
(1\ ~-fil l'<'<Jilt··:tt·d t Judi•·i:tl detr:rmination of the applicability of the 
r·estr·i,·tj,,. UJ'vc·tnnt.s to t!H· l:trg" commercictl lot, by con-.:truing the 
rt·."tr·Jr:liv<· t·Ov<·n tnt,; documt·nt together w1th thf: recorded pl:tt incorporJtec 
onh 111 tht· lltpr·rntive, :t n·fot'mation of the n•:,trictl'''-' co,·<·nctnb uocumen: 
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to c·onfonn with thL: ollv1ous intent of the ueveloper. 1\s such, the only 
issue in tlw motion for summary juugmcnt was whether, as a matter 
of law, the rc~trictive covenants document applies to the large ten acre 
(no.v five ctcre) commercial lot when the restrictive covenants document 
and the recorued plat are read together, irrespective of any mistake or 
reformation. It wa:; well within the prerogatives of the District Court 
to grclnt Plain tiffs- Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment without 
considering Defenuants-Appellants' defense of statute of limitations where 
.such defen:;e is clearly irrelevant, immaterial and inapplicable to the 
court's dctermine1tion of the non-applicability of the restrictive covenants 
to the co:nmercial lot. 
The mere fact that Plaintiffs- Respondents originally alleged 
that the designe1tion of the large commercial lot as No. 1 was done by 
mistake and/or inadvertence is not controlling inasmuch as the statute of 
limitatio:-~s (Utah Code Annotated, 78-12-26(3)) is only applicable where 
relief is sought on the ground of mistake. In an instant case, Plaintiffs-
Hespondents sought, and the court granted, the summary judgment on the 
basis that the restrictive covenants are inapplicable to the large five acre 
tract and were never intended to be so. (R 241, 242). As such, Defendants-
Appellant:;' defenc;e of the statute of limitations is clearly without merit 
and the trial court was justified in so finding. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wlwrc there wa"' no genuine issue of any n1aterial fact 
raised in oppoc.ition th-.1t was relevant ormatcrial to the dispo:-,ition 
of the motion fur summary judgment, the trial jucg e was justified in 
averting the substantial damage and delay caused by the burden of an 
unnecessary trial. 
The: record clearly establishes that the language of the 
restr·icti\ ,. CO\ cnants documc>nt with the plat incorporated therein is 
ambiguoas tlw intent of which is unascertainable without reference to 
extrinsic evidence. The trial court was well within its discretion in 
considering cxtnnsic evidence of the intent of the subdivision developer. 
In examination of the evidence before the trial judge on the 
motion for ~ummary judgment, the decision that the restrictive covenants 
document does not apply to the large commercial lot did not constitute 
reversible error. 
Defendants -Appellants' defense of the statute of limitations 
was without merit to the motion for summary judgment inasmuch as 
interpretation of the restrictive covenants precluded the necessity of 
reformmg thP document. 
THEREFORE, the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
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